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Introduction
Background
The concept of distributive justice has been extensively studied
in political philosophy and economics over the past few decades.
One of the most important milestones in this field is Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice [1], which put forward equality as an outcome of
the social contract that individuals behind a veil of ignorance
should agree on. Even though egalitarian doctrine that all human
persons are equal in fundamental worth or moral status is a
commonly shared idea, egalitarianism turns out to be a contested
concept. There have been several divergent understandings of the
meaning of equality, ways to achieve equality, or the metric to
measure equality [2,3]. For instance, someone who puts more
emphasis on equality of opportunity may have a very different
opinion from those who put emphasis on equality of incomes in
spite of the overall agreement on the concept of equality per se.
Among numerous dimensions where egalitarianism varies, the
question of what should be equalized is one that many different
theories are competing on; is it opportunity, capabilities, resource
or welfare [2–6]? Dworkin, one of the most influential proponents
of resource egalitarianism, admits the immediate appeal of the
idea that it must ultimately be equality of welfare insofar as
equality is important, and examines the logical consistency and
practical applicability of this welfare egalitarianism [7]. According
to Dworkin, welfare egalitarianism, concerned with equality in
every person’s overall satisfaction, has an inconsistency in its logic.
For example, if one accepts the idea that those who are
handicapped need more resources to achieve equal welfare, the
same argument should apply to those who have expensive tastes
for the same reason. However, one should immediately recognize
that the appeal of welfare egalitarianism becomes much less strong
in the case of expensive tastes than in the case of the handicapped.
The fact that the same idea can be accepted in some cases and
seems disturbing in other cases reveals a logical inconsistency of
welfare egalitarianism. Dworkin also criticized welfare-based
egalitarianism on that it inevitably relies on the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons of utility, which places a large burden
to a policy maker in practice. Lastly, Dworkin argues that it would
probably prove impossible to reach a reasonable degree of equality
in this conception in a community whose members held very
different and very deeply felt political theories about justice in
distribution.
The last point is the one that we focus on in this paper. We will
show that the existence of contradictory political theories does not
immediately lead to the impossibility but can be formulated as
dynamics which admits a unique solution under certain assump-
tions. By doing this, we will argue that the reasoning in [7] can be
regarded as a tool to analyze and advocate the idea of equality in
welfare. To some extent, this is complementary to a previous work
which argues that one can reach the idea of equality in welfare by
starting from that of equality in resources [8]. Following the logic
that Dworkin used when he showed the impossibility to reach an
agreement on redistribution in terms of welfare, we also set aside
the issues of logical inconsistency and inter-personal comparisons
of individuals’ welfare. To focus on the relationship between
individual preferences and resulting welfare, we also set aside the
issue of impartiality (see, e.g., [9,10]). We will further assume that
individuals have preferences over the distribution of welfare
among them [11,12]. Many theoretical and experimental studies
have shown that people are concerned with equality and fairness
and often persist in fairness even when they lose monetary payoffs
in doing so, e.g., in the public games, ultimatum games or dictator
games. This behavior cannot be explained based on the
assumption of self-regarding preferences but of others-regarding
preferences or social preferences. Our formulation in this paper
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because it tells us a way to translate others’ payoffs into an
individual’s with respect to individual preference.
Model
Let the concept of welfare be understood as the fulfillment of
preferences [13], including success in political preferences, i.e.,
opinions of how welfare should be distributed. Then the reasoning
by Dworkin [7] argues that such an egalitarian society, where
everyone is concerned with the equality, will end up with
supporting non-egalitarians by its own logic. Suppose that a bigot
enters an egalitarian society, with an opinion that some people
deserve more than the others. This person will feel frustrated to see
that her political preferences are not accepted by egalitarian
neighbors, and her welfare becomes relatively lower than the
others’. If there is an official committed to compensating for
inequality in welfare, by reallocating resources for example, the
bigot should get extra resources from the official due to her
political frustration, because she does not support the egalitarian
idea of the society. This is called Dworkin’s paradox in this work.
Particularly we note that it can serve as an idealized model to
represent our understanding of a modern democratic society. We
will look into this hypothetical society a little closer.
Imagine a society of N persons and an official. The official,
representing a social institution, exists to mediate the global
coordination. We assume that the total amount of welfare to be
distributed among the persons is fixed as unity, and that the
welfare is infinitely divisible, since we are interested only in relative
fractions rather than absolute amounts that individuals have. The
official herself does not take part in sharing the welfare, but only
receives the N persons’ opinions and find a way to distribute the
welfare among them. Let each person i have a certain preference
about how the welfare should be distributed, say
vi~(vi1,vi2,...,viN) with
P
j vij~1. We denote the actual welfare
distribution as r~(r1,r2,...rN). The person i’s welfare is
determined by the extent to which her preference is fulfilled. In
other words, we consider an equation
ri~F(vi,r) ð1Þ
with a certain function F, which is assumed to equally apply to all
the persons. We suppose that the official wants to announce a
stable welfare distribution r such that each person’s relative share
remains unchanged after the announcement, which means that r
solves Eq. (1) self-consistently. It is important to note that the
preferences reported by each individual are assumed to be true
and available to the official at every moment, which helps us to
focus on basic ideas of the paradox. A few remarks are in order.
First, we emphasize that the official plays only a passive role in this
setup. As we will see below, the society reaches the same self-
consistent solution as long as every person’s welfare becomes
public knowledge all the time. The official may guarantee such
information to be accessible and accelerate the coordination but
the official is basically assigned limited tasks compared to the
original argument. Second, related to the first point, we do not
require the division of welfare to be impartial from a certain
observer’s point of view. Our question is simply how much
fulfillment one can get depending on her preference. In this sense,
our approach differs from the impartial-division problem [9] and
does not touch conceptual difficulties of impartiality (see, e.g.,
[10]). Finally, individuals are not behind the veil of ignorance.
Rather, each of them is supposed to construct a concrete opinion
about every other individual using any kind of available
information. Although this can impose practical difficulties in a
large society, it helps us avoid any theoretical ambiguity or conflict
with the ethic of priority [14] found in the veil of ignorance [15].
In order to give a more concrete form to Eq. (1), we first
consider how to measure similarity or affinity between distribu-
tions and then plug it into Eq. (1). Suppose two arbitrary
distributions, p~(p1,...,pN) and q~(q1,...,qN), with pi§0,
qi§0, and
PN
i pi~
PN
i qi~1. We define a suitable affinity
function rN(p,q) between them, whose specific functional form
will be characterized by requiring the following four postulates
[16]. First, we postulate separability, which means that one can
refine affinity contribution from a certain bin by looking into the
bin in a higher resolution without referring to the outside of the
bin. Second, we postulate invariance under permutation, because
every bin is equivalent. Third, the affinity should be non-negative,
i.e., rN(p,q)§0, where rN(p,q)~0 if and only if p is orthogonal to
q, whereas a maximum value is obtained if and only if p~q. The
distributions p and q are orthogonal when pi~0 for every non-
zero qi and vice versa. Last, it should be symmetric in the sense
that rN(p,q)~rN(q,p), which is intuitively justified. These four
postulates characterize our affinity function as
rN(p,q)!
X N
i~1
(piqi)
1=2, ð2Þ
commonly known as the Bhattacharyya measure [17]. While
details of the derivation are shown in Supporting Information Text
S1, this functional form has a clear geometric interpretation: it can
be viewed as a dot product of two vectors (
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x1
p
,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2
p
,...
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xN
p
) and
(
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
y1
p
,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
y2
p
,...
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
yN
p
), both of which are located on an N-
dimensional unit sphere by
P
i
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
xi
p    2~
P
i
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
yi
p    2~1.I t
therefore becomes maximized when two vectors point in the
same direction.
It is plausible to assume that the function F(vi,r) in Eq. (1) will
be a non-decreasing function of the affinity between vi and r,
so that F(vi,r)~F½rN(vi,r) . Specifically, we infer that
F(vi,r)!r2
N(vi,r), since rN(vi,r) contains dimensionality of
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri
p
according to Eq. (2). The precise value of the proportionality
coefficient should be determined by the normalization condition of
r. For notational convenience, let us define s:(s1,s2,...,sN) with
si:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri
p
and wi:(wi1,wi2,...,wiN) with wij: ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ vij
p . Equation (1)
then leads to si!
P
j wijsj, or in a matrix form,
s~l
{1Ws ð3Þ
where W: wij
  
and l is for normalizing DsD
2, the total welfare.
This formalism is reminiscent of the quantum mechanics, where a
wavefunction y is obtained by solving an eigenvalue problem
Hy~Ey with a Hamiltonian matrix H and its eigenvalue E.
What one can measure in experiments is probability density DyD
2.
An N-dimensional matrix preserving DsD
2 is called orthogonal, and
its degrees of freedom is the number of possible planes of rotation
in N dimension, which is N(N{1)=2. Since W generally has N2
elements and N normalization conditions, it has N(N{1) degrees
of freedom, so the magnitude of l will differ from one in general.
Results
Two-person Case
The simplest example of W describes a situation where two
persons have not ever conceived of each other as a society member
Dworkin’s Paradox
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W~
10
01
  
:
This identity matrix does not change the input state at all, which
means that the official cannot really coordinate these two
indifferent persons’ opinions in the way that we have assumed.
This is actually an example of a reducible matrix [18] or a society
that can be divided into smaller pieces: W is irreducible if there
exists a sequence of ½k1,k2,...,kn  for any i and j such that
wik1|wk1k2|   |wknj is non-zero. Otherwise, W is reducible.
Such a reducible case is not our concern since a society is
meaningful only when individuals interact with each other.
Henceforth, only irreducible cases are considered. Then, unless
everyone has zero self-interest, one can prove that there exists a
unique stable distribution rp for every W by using the Perron-
Frobenius theorem [18]. In other words, rp is the only stable fixed
point under the action of W, so the official should distribute
welfare as given by rp.
Let us consider a situation where an egalitarian with
v1~(1=2,1=2) meets a selfish person with v2~(0:01,0:99). The
corresponding matrix formulation will be
W~
1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
1=10
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
99
p
=10
 !
: ð4Þ
and its stable welfare distribution is obtained by analyzing
eigenvectors as rp&(0:72,0:28). We arrive at this rp even if we
start from r~(0:5,0:5) for the following reason: let r be known to
both the persons every time step. The egalitarian first feels happy
to see the initial equality in r~(0:5,0:5), while the selfish person
feels unsatisfied, which makes a difference at the next step. The
drop in r2 makes the selfish person even more upset, so her welfare
continues to decrease until it reaches the stable value, r2~0:28.
We now show that egalitarianism is the minimax solution of this
two-person zero-sum game [19]. Generalizing Eq. (4) as
W~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v11
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1{v11
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1{v22
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v22
p
 !
, ð5Þ
the eigenvalue analysis yields the converged share for the first
person, r1, as shown in Fig. 1. It is a saddle-like shape and this
person can minimize risk when she has demanded a moderate
share of 1=2 at the first place. The same is true for the other person
as well. Although we have assumed fixed preferences in developing
the model, if the preferences can evolve in the long run to
maximize individual welfare, therefore, this plot shows that this
two-person case will lead to an equal welfare distribution.
In practice, a selfish person can be tempted to deceive the
official by reporting a false preference to receive a larger share.
Provided that person 2 has claimed her self-interest as a certain
value v22, person 1 can always compute the best reply ~ v v11~b(v22)
by looking up the maximal share ~ r r1 at the given v22 in Fig. 1. Even
if her true self-interest v11 is higher than this false ~ v v11, she should
still report ~ v v11 to the official, knowing that she cannot get better
than ~ r r1 in any way. When person 1 has chosen ~ v v11 for this reason,
the same consideration will lead person 2 to choose
~ v v22~b(~ v v11)~b½b(v22) , and this reasoning can be repeated
between them ad infinitum. Such a strategic consideration
eventually forces them to choose the egalitarian preference in
common, since successive iteration of the best-reply function b
drives every initial input v22 [ ½0,1) into the egalitarian fixed point,
although none of the players are really egalitarians.
Egalitarianism as a Nash Equilibrium
Let us consider an N-person case where all except one are
egalitarian. That is, vi~(1=N,...,1=N) for every i=1.W e
observe that these N{1 persons will have exactly the same welfare
since they always get the same amount of affinity for any welfare
distribution r. Let us thus denote every egalitarian’s welfare as a
single variable R. Recalling the separability, we find that all the
elements v1i with i=1 must be the same in order to maximize
person 19s welfare, because her preference about the egalitarians
should match with welfare distribution among them. Therefore,
person 1 should have a preference of v1~(v11,V,V,   ,V) with
Figure 1. Person 19s welfare in the two-person case, obtained from Eq. (5). The curves on the plane show contour lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038529.g001
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calculation can be simplified to the following 2|2 matrix
calculation.
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v11
p
(N{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1=N
p
(N{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1=N
p
 ! ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r1
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
p
 !
~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v11r1
p
z(N{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VR
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r1=N
p
z(N{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=N
p
 !
with a normalization condition r1z(N{1)R~1. The stable
distribution from the simplified matrix then yields r1 as a function
of v11, which has Lr1=Lv11~0 and r1~1=N at v11~1=N. In short,
the best possible preference for person 1 is an egalitarian one. If
egalitarianism is pervasive, one gets worse off by having another
type of preference, which means that egalitarianism is a strict Nash
equilibrium [20]. This reproduces Dworkin’s paradox in mathe-
matical terms in the sense that a non-egalitarian in an egalitarian
society will have relatively less welfare. A difference from the
original paradox is that the official cannot really compensate the
non-egalitarian within our formulation since the welfare distribu-
tion will converge to the same point again as soon as the
compensation is known in public.
Inhomogeneous Society
Egalitarian preference can be still favorable even when people
are all different. For instance, people are not equally born. Let this
unavoidable inequality be described by a uniform random variable
fi [ ½{1,1 . Person i’s overall political preference can be
described by another uniform random variable wi [
({1=N,1=N): for wi~0, this person is an egalitarian. If wiw0,
she believes that the better deserve more, while wiv0 means the
opposite. In addition, wi is assumed to be uncorrelated with fi. The
political preference is then assigned as vij~wifjz1=N, which
satisfies vijw0. Since fj is a relative quantity, one can always
subtract an offset value to make
P
j fj~0, by which the
normalization condition
P
j vij~1 is satisfied. We can obtain the
stable distribution by taking N as a very large constant and
assuming that ri is a function of wi only. By replacing the
summation in
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri(wi)
p
!
PN
j~1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
wifjz1=N
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj(wj)
q
by an inte-
gral, we get
ri(wi)~2w
{2
i (wiz1=N)
3=2{({wiz1=N)
3=2
hi 2
=(3pz8),
where the proportionality coefficient is determined by the
normalization condition. This ri is an even function of wi with a
maximum ri(wi~0)~18=(3pz8)|1=N&1:033=N, implying the
highest fulfillment for an egalitarian. One could point out that this
ri(wi) describes just one possible distribution, not necessarily the
stable one. However, we see that the integral is positive for all wi,
and thus for all i, and the Perron-Frobenius theorem tells us that
this positivity is true only for the stable distribution [18]. This
justifies our starting assumption that person i’s welfare ri is not
determined by her innate part fi but by her political preference wi
in this society. It is notable that critics have said that the idea of
equality in welfare is insensitive to individual responsibility [7]. As
explained in [21], one may consider a set of variables character-
izing an individual and classify them into two categories: the first
category consists of innate properties such as talents that an
individual is hardly responsible for. The second category, on the
other hand, includes choices and even some of preferences that we
can connect to individual responsibility. If we regard fi as
representing the first category while wi as representing the second
category, this example shows that each individual does take
responsibility for her political preference but not for her talents.
It could be also argued that the limit N?? squeezes
wi[({1=N,1=N) into zero so that the whole problem reduces to
the egalitarian society above, where everyone gets ri~1=N. That
can be regarded as a first-order approximation of this problem.
The calculation given here shows that an egalitarian indeed
receives 3:3% more than in the crude approximation.
Homogeneously Unequal Preference
In all the cases considered so far, preferences could be said to be
neutral on the society level in the sense that there is no systematic
bias over the whole society. Let us now imagine that N{1 persons
with identical preferences, h~(h1,h2,...,hN), but not necessarily
egalitarians. The other person indexed by k has another type of
preference, vk~(vk1,vk2,...,vkN). By the similar reasoning as in
the egalitarian society, the situation can be simplified to the
following 2|2 matrix:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
vkk
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(N{1)(1{vkk
p
)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hk
p P 0
i
’
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hi
p
0
B @
1
C A,
where
P0
i ’ means a summation over i excluding k. Recall that the
(N{1) persons with an identical preference have the same
amount of fulfillment so person k should not distinguish them in
order to maximize affinity between her preference and the welfare
distribution among them. The above matrix means that we should
only determine how to divide welfare between the person k and
the other (N{1) persons. The eigenvalue analysis leads to
rk~(1{vkk)(1{vkkzX2=4) ð6Þ
with
X:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
vkk
p
{H{
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
vkk
p
{H)
2z4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hk(N{1)(1{vkk)
p q
and H:
P0
i ’
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hi
p
. We can differentiate Eq. (6) with respect to vkk
to find the maximum. An easier alternative way is to observe from
the separability that the maximum value is obtained when rk~vkk,
because the question is how to match person k’s preference
(vkk,1{vkk) with the welfare distribution (rk,1{rk), where the
second elements represent the whole (N{1) persons. By solving
rk~vkk with Eq. (6), one can get vkk maximizing rk as a solution of
the following equation,
½hk(N{1)zH2 w4{2Hw3z(1{H2)w2z2Hw{1~0, ð7Þ
with w:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
vkk
p
. For the egalitarian h with hk~1=N and
H~(N{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1=N
p
, substituting vkk~1=N satisfies Eq. (7), con-
sistently with the analysis of the (N{1) egalitarians. We may also
suppose that h describes an unequal distribution so that the whole
society is biased in a certain way. As a specific example, let us
assume that hi!i2, that is, almost everyone wants people with
higher indices to have more welfare. With a normalization
constant, it should mean that hi~i2=Z with
Z:N(Nz1)(2Nz1)=6, and we thus have
Dworkin’s Paradox
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X N
i~1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hi
p
{
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hk
p
~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
6N(Nz1)
p
=(2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2Nz1
p
){k=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Z
p
:
Inserting this into Eq. (6), we plot rk in Fig. 2, where the
maximum is found at the crossing with rk~vkk. It is a little higher
than 1=N for every k. We can do the same calculation for a more
severe situation of inequality by setting hi!i4, which again yields
the same conclusion with a bit larger vkk. The difference between
the optimal vkk and 1=N does not vanish as N?? whether hi!i2
or i4. This can be shown by inserting vkk~1=N on the left-hand
side of Eq. (7) and taking N??, which does not yield zero on the
right-hand side. Therefore, the person k should demand a little
more for herself than before and distribute the remainder of the
preferences equally to the others, even though they are far from
egalitarians, in order to get the maximum welfare.
Transient Behavior
In order to see whether egalitarians can eventually take over the
society, we need to check whether the egalitarian preference
remains as an attractive alternative when the society has both
egalitarians and non-egalitarians with significant numbers. Let us
imagine an inhomogeneous society where there are roughly two
large groups: every person in one group of size N{M occupies a
high index i and believes that the welfare should be proportional
to i2. On the other hand, every person in the other group of size
M{1 has a low index and an egalitarian preference. Our question
is what kind of preference is good for a person on the border, i.e.,
with index i~M. Again, since people with identical preferences
will get the same amount of welfare, the focal person on the border
need not distinguish the members in each group: suppose that she
wishes vM1 for each member in the egalitarian group and vMN for
each member in the non-egalitarian group. The normalization
condition then determines her self-interest vMM~1{(M{1)vM1
{(N{M)vMN. Depending on how she decides vM1 and vMN, her
final welfare rM will be calculated by analyzing the following 3|3
matrix,
(M{1)=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1=N
p
(N{M)=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
(M{1)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vM1
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vMM
p
(N{M)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vMN
p
M(M{1)
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Z
p M=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Z
p N(Nz1)
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Z
p {
M(Mz1)
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Z
p
0
B B B @
1
C C C A
, ð8Þ
where the second row describes this focal person M. The
conservation of the total welfare is imposed by setting
(M{1)rM1zrMMz(N{M)rMN~1. When M is small, the
maximum of rM is close to the egalitarian solution
(vM1,vMN)~(1=N,1=N) (Fig. 3A). It agrees with the result of
the homogeneously unequal preferences given above since the
egalitarian preference is still an absolute minority. Hence, if this
person M can choose her own preference, the society will possibly
have one more egalitarian. As M becomes larger, however, the
situation gets different in that the maximum is located far from the
egalitarian solution (Fig. 3B). It implies that the transition process
toward the egalitarian direction may exhibit transient behavior,
instead of being smooth all the time.
Discussion
The theory of welfare is not an empty ideal as claimed in [7]:
dealing with a society where everyone has an identical non-
egalitarian preference, we have found that the theory recommends
something very similar to an egalitarian preference, instead of just
rubber-stamping the dominant non-egalitarian opinion. In addi-
tion, this finding shows that the egalitarian society is in fact the only
strict Nash equilibrium. We therefore conclude that our analysis
gives a strong support to equality of welfare by specifying which
social and political conditions make it possible.
On the other hand, our conclusion implies that a society can
encourage egalitarianism by guaranteeing freedom of communi-
cation so that everyone can constantly express her fulfillment in
public. In this respect, we can perhaps mention one of the central
messages in [7] that ‘‘liberty is essential to any process in which
equality is defined and secured.’’ In particular, we would like to
put an extra emphasis on the communicative aspect of the liberty.
On a longer perspective, our results suggest an explanation of
how the concept of fairness could develop at a certain moment in
the history of evolution when human beings became able to
construct internal expectation for the future and understand
others’ minds by communication. It is also worth stressing that our
Figure 2. Equation (6) as a function of vkk when hi!i2 for N~10.
The horizontal line shows rk~1=N. The maximum of rk is located at the
crossing with the line rk~vkk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038529.g002
Figure 3. rM(vM1,vMN) obtained by solving Eq. (8) within a
region 0ƒ(M{1)vM1z(N{M)vMNƒ1 for N~10. (A) M~2. (B)
M~5. The crosses show (vM1,vMN)~(1=N,1=N).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038529.g003
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certain well-defined conditions is strong enough to open further
theoretical extensions and empirical tests.
Methods
We solve the eigenvalue problem of matrix W in each case
analytically or numerically by using the power method.
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